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In September 2010, the Fourmile-Lefthand Canyon forest fire burned 6,181 acres, 
destroyed 169 homes, and caused $217 million in property damages making it by far the most 
expensive fire in Colorado history at the time. This paper examines how the fire affected housing 
prices in vulnerable neighboring areas that were not directly impacted by the fire, controlling for 
the property’s level of risk. This damaging fire may have increased home owners’ perceptions 
about the risk of living in forested areas subject to wildfires to a significant degree adding to the 
total direct economic losses from the fire. Utilizing a unique fire risk data set and a difference-in-
difference approach, we test whether buyers of houses in areas with different risk levels prior to 
the fire adjust expectations differently. We find buyers in the highest risk area are most likely to 
change their perceptions in response to a fire with houses in these areas experiencing a 
statistically significant 21.9% decline in sale price.  
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 In September 2010, the Fourmile Canyon forest fire burned 6,181 acres, destroyed 169 
homes, and caused $217 million in property damages in the mountains directly west of Boulder, 
Colorado. At the time, the Fourmile fire was the most damaging in Colorado history with insured 
losses five times larger than the next most expensive recorded forest fire in the state’s history and 
over twice as large as the losses from the next ten most damaging Colorado fires combined. (See 
Table 1).  It also burned more houses than any previous Colorado wildfire, and its location just 
five miles west of downtown Boulder, a major urban center, served to focus significant local and 
national media attention on the event. 
 The damage caused by the Fourmile Canyon fire was a magnitude greater than anything 
seen in Colorado previously, but within two years, its destruction was exceeded by the High Park 
fire in Larimer Country west of Fort Collins and the Waldo Canyon fire in the outskirts of 
Colorado Springs. In June 2012, the High Park fire burned 87,250 acres (the second largest fire 
in Colorado history), destroyed 256 homes (exceeding the record set by the Fourmile fire), and 
caused $113.7 million in insured damages. With the High Park fire not yet fully contained, the 
Waldo Canyon fire erupted west of Colorado Springs. It eventually consumed 18,247 acres, 
destroyed 347 homes, and caused $453.7 million in insured property damages, breaking the 
records set by the Fourmile Canyon fire.  The Colorado Springs area was hit again in 2013 when 
the Black Forest fire consumed more than 14,000 acres and destroyed 489 homes worth $420.5 
million, eclipsing the Waldo Canyon fire in terms of homes destroyed. 
While wildfires are nothing new to Colorado, it is evident that the severity of damages 
associated with forest fires has risen dramatically in just the past few years. In the thirty years 
between 1976 and 2006, 387 homes across the state were lost to forest fires, while over 1,326 
were destroyed in just the three years between 2010 and 2013.  At least three root causes can 
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serve to explain the increase in fire damages. First, fire suppression techniques and forest 
management over the past century have led to an increase in damaging fires across the country. 
Second, climate change is contributing to weather and forest conditions that favor fires. 
According to the National Research Council (2011), the mountains and foothills west of the 
major population centers in Colorado can expect a 656% percent “increase in burned areas… for 
a 1.8°F increase in global average temperatures relative to the median area burned during 1950-
2003.” Finally, Colorado has experienced a large increase in the population living in areas at 
high risk for wildfires. In 2010, 1.1 million Coloradans lived is a so-called “red-zone,” an 
increase of 29 percent since 1990 (Kodas and Hubbard, 2012).  
While the damage directly caused by wildfires is clear, this paper seeks to examine the 
effect of wildfires on home prices in at-risk but unaffected areas. While natural disaster risk is 
clearly incorporated in the price of any housing unit, a fire of the magnitude of the Fourmile, 
Black Forest, High Park, or Waldo Canyon fires may serve to change public perceptions of risk 
in a measurable way.  By estimating the impact on house values for areas that were not directly 
impacted, we can more fully understand the economic effect of these fires.  In addition, our work 
allows us to consider whether owners of homes that are exposed to different risk levels change 
perceptions in different ways after a fire takes place. 
 
Literature Review 
The existing literature on the economic effect of natural disasters on housing prices has 
often addressed the issue of risk. Bin and Polasky (2004), Chivers and Flores (2002), and Atreya, 
Ferreira, and Kriesel (2013) all examine the effect of major floods on housing prices in flood 
plains, i.e. areas at high risk for flood damages. All three papers note that local housing values in 
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flood plains are observed to fall immediately after flooding events, but the decrease in prices 
tends to be short-lived.  
Donovan, Champ, and Butry (2007) examine home prices in the wilderness-urban 
interface in El Paso County, Colorado, the location of the Waldo Canyon fire, both before and 
after the Colorado Springs Fire Department rated the wildfire risk of 35,000 local housing 
parcels in 2000 in an effort to increase awareness of risk. Prior to the on-line publication of the 
wildfire risk data, fire risk was positively correlated to housing prices (presumably due to the 
amenity aspects of solitude and the proximity of natural beauty) while after the publication of the 
risk assessment the “benefits” of owning a home prone to fire risk was significantly reduced. It is 
worth noting that Donovan, Champ, and Butry (2007) specifically mention the potential for large 
fires to affect housing values but do not test specifically for this possibility. To wit, 
There is one other factor to consider when evaluating the effectiveness of this 
educational campaign. In June 2002, the Hayman fire burned 138,000 acres 
mostly on the Pike National Forest (17,000 acres were on the Pikes Peak Ranger 
District); it destroyed 132 homes and came within 20 miles of Colorado Springs. 
Although homeowners in the study area were not directly threatened by the 
Hayman fire, some of the observed effect on the housing market may be 
attributable to this fire. We cannot determine how much of the observed effect on 
the housing market was due to the educational campaign and how much was due 
to the Hayman fire. (Donovan, Champ, and Butry, 2007, pg. 232) 
 
Stetler, Venn, and Calkin (2010) study 18,785 housing sales in Montana from June 1996 
to January 2007.  Their model includes neighborhood characteristics such as distance to the 
nearest golf course, and environmental variables such as distance to major lakes and rivers.  
Their wildfire variables included distance to the nearest wildfire perimeter in the previous seven 
years, and if the area burned could be seen from the home.  They find home prices in the 
northwest portion of the state less than 5 km and between 5 km and 10 km from a wildfire burn 
area were 13.7% ($33,232) and 7.6% ($18,924) lower, respectively, than equivalent homes at 
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least 20 km from a fire.  Homes with views of burn areas decreased in value even further.  In this 
work the authors control for distance from a fire, but not explicitly for risk.  It may be that 
distance and risk are correlated, but their results do not provide direct evidence of impact of a 
change in risk.   
Loomis, Mueller, and Gonzalez-Caban (2009) examine prices of homes within 1.75 miles 
of a series of three fires that took place between 1989 and 2003 in Southern California near the 
Angeles National Forest. They find that home prices respond to repeated fires by falling 
significantly. While housing prices fell only 9.7% after one fire, they dropped an additional 
22.7% after the second wildfire. Their model, however, only controls for distance to the center of 
each wildfire; there is no control for the level of risk to which each house is exposed.   
Loomis (2004) examines 134 properties sales before and over 300 sales after the Buffalo 
Creek wildfire in 1996 that burned 12,000 acres and destroyed 10 homes near the community of 
Pine, Colorado. The study finds a 15% decrease in home values in the neighboring community 
after the fire, a result that the author suggests is due to a revised attitude of homebuyers 
regarding the perceived wildfire risk of the area or a loss in forest amenities in the community.  
While house characteristics are included in the regression, there is no measure of distance from 
the fire, nor is there any control for the level of risk each house is subject to.  The results do 
suggest that buyers adjust their perceptions after a wildfire. 
Xu and van Kooten (2013) also identify a decrease in property values associated with 
forest fires. Most directly related to the research here is the fact that they find more significant 
reductions in property values associated with larger fires. Thus, if their results are applicable in 
Colorado, a fire the magnitude of the Fourmile fire should have the most significant effects on 
property values.  
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Data and Model 
 Data for 9,630 single family housing sales that occurred between January 2009 and April 
2012 in Boulder County, where the Fourmile Canyon fire occurred, were purchased from the 
Warren Group. This time period represents roughly 18 months before and after the Fourmile 
Canyon fire, and the data end two months prior to the even larger High Park and Waldo Canyon 
fires. The data include sales date and price, housing structural characteristics, and address data 
for GIS geocoding and mapping. Because relevant variables regarding the fire risk associated 
with each house’s location was not available for other areas, the sample was limited to housing 
sales in Boulder County.  Neighborhood characteristics were collected via the Census website 
and were applied to each house based on their census tracts (see Table 2 for descriptive 
statistics).  Observations were omitted if the house listed zero bedrooms or bathrooms, reported 
living space equal to zero, was situated in a location with a fire risk assessed as zero, had a 
clearly identifiable typographical error, or could be identified as a non-market or non- arms-
length transaction where the sales price would not reflect the actual value of the house. After 
cleaning, 9,403 housing sales remained. See Figure 1 for a map of house sales locations in 
Boulder County. 
 In order to include the fire risk for each house as a characteristic of the house, we utilized 
a rating system from the Boulder county GIS website that assessed the risk of damage that would 
occur due to a forest fire (given that one occurred) to different areas of Boulder County. The fire 
risk in various areas was rated as “very high,” “high,” “medium,” or “low.” According the 
county office,  
“This data represents a classification of the expected relative wildfire severity under the 
assumption of the occurrence of a moderate to high severity fire weather event within 
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Boulder County. This assessment is based on the physical attributes of slope, aspect and 
vegetation fuel type, and is based on the USDA Forest Service's fire behavior model 
BEHAVE and Van Wegner's crown fire spread equations.” (Boulder County Land Use, 
2000)  
 
Using this information, we were able to merge the risk rating to the homes based on the 
overlaying of information in the GIS program. See Figure 2 for a map of the levels of risk along 
with house sales locations. Figure 2 shows the eastern half of the county, an area of plains and 
the most populous region, is generally designated as low risk while areas in the mountainous and 
generally heavily forested western half of the county carries higher risk ratings. 
 The hedonic house pricing model assumes that the sales price of a house can be broken 
down into the price of each observed characteristic of the house (see Rosen, 1974 and Freeman, 
1993).  When environmental factors such as fire risk are included in the estimated model, the 
estimated coefficient reveals the price that individuals must be compensated in order to take on 
the increased risk.  
 The previous papers using hedonic pricing to value fire risk either examine fires that did 
not occur during the time period of the data or utilize a simple dummy variable to identify house 
sales that occur after a fire has taken place. If a study only examines fires that occurred prior to 
the time period of the data, such as Stetler, Venn, and Calkin (2010), it is clear that the study 
cannot be used to measure the change in risk perception that can occur from a major disaster. If a 
study examines current fires but only utilizes a simply dummy variable for measuring the time 
period after the fire, such as  Loomis, Mueller, and Gonzalez-Caban (2009) and Loomis (2004), 
then any results can be affected by general trends or volatility in housing prices or changes in the 
mix of the riskiness of housing sold. 
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 In order to correct for these potential problems, we utilize hedonic pricing incorporating a 
difference-in-differences technique (see Wooldridge, 2009 for a discussion). The model to be 
estimated is 
	 	 ∗  
	
where xik is a vector of house specific characteristics including age of the house (age) as well as 
age squared (age_sq), the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, lot acreage (lot_area), and the 
square footage of the home’s living area (bldg_livin). These are standard variables commonly 
included in hedonic analyses of housing.  yim is a vector of neighborhood characteristics based on 
the census tract in which the house is located including the racial composition of the population 
(pct_white, pct_black, pct_hispanic) and the percentage of population below poverty level 
(below_poverty).  Dummy variables for the city in which each house was located were also 
included.  
Two models are estimated with a different measure of risk included in each model. e 
level of risk for each house of the severity of fire is categorized by  
Model (1) groups together all houses with a risk above “low” so that a variable (risk_adj) 
is generated and set equal to one if the house is determined to reside with a very high, high, or 
medium risk fire zone and zero otherwise. As can be seen in Table 2, roughly 4% of all single 
family home sales in our data set involved houses located in an area with a risk level above low. 
In model (2), we create a dummy variable for each risk category (very_high_risk, high_risk, 
medium_risk, and low_risk) separately with the “low” category serving as the omitted variable in 
the regression. We have no prior expectation of sign of the coefficients on risk variables as 
homes in high risk areas may also be in “high amenity” areas. 
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The difference-in-difference approach is commonly used when data come from a natural 
experiment caused by an exogenous event.  The event then leads to a control group that is not 
impacted by the event, and a treatment group that may be impacted.  Since the two groups are 
not randomly chosen in a natural experiment, systematic differences in the groups need to be 
controlled for.  By using data from before and after the event, we can consider four different 
groups: the control group before and after the event, and the treatment group before and after the 
event.  Then the estimate of the impact of the event on house prices is the difference of the 
difference in the average prices between the two groups before and after the event.   
The variable “after_dummy” takes on a value of one for house sales that took place in the 
time period after the Fourmile fire, and zero otherwise, and distinguishes between sales before 
and after the event.  We have no prior expectation of this sign, but since the trend in house prices 
in the time period after the fire was generally positive, it is likely that this coefficient will be 
positive.  Finally, interaction terms between the after dummy variable and the various measures 
of risk are created. For Model (1), the estimated coefficient on “risk_adj_eff” (equal to 
“risk_adj”*”after_dummy”) is then an estimate of the difference in the difference of average 
prices, and will allow us to test whether people purchasing homes after the fire viewed risk 
differently than those who purchased before the fire.  For Model (2), “very_high_risk_eff”, 




 The average sales prices for Model (1) in areas of the combined high risk and low risk 
both before and after the fire are included in Table 3.  Notice that the house sales prices in the 
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high-risk area were greater than those in the low risk area prior to the fire.  This suggests that 
homes in those areas have more natural amenities such as views, which leads to higher sales 
prices.  After the fire, however, homes in the riskier areas sold at a lower prices after the fire 
while housing prices were increasing in low risk areas.  This leads us to expect that buyers in 
riskier areas changed the values placed on environmental amenities relative to the value placed 
on risk after the fire took place.  Of course, these numbers do not control for the characteristics 
of the homes or their neighborhoods, which is why regression analysis is called for.  Table 4 
includes information on how many sales occurred in each risk category and when the sales 
occurred. 
The regression results are in Table 5. Column 1 reports the coefficients for model (1) 
with one combined risk category for all houses in areas above low-risk.  Column 2 reports the 
coefficients for model (3) including three separate risk categories. In both models the housing 
characteristics take on the expected signs, and all but the area of the lot are statistically 
significant.  The neighborhood characteristics from the census track data are also of the expected 
signs and are statistically significant.1  The city variables, with the unincorporated areas as the 
excluded area, are also as expected.   
 For model (1) the coefficient on the after indicator variable (after_dummy) suggests that 
house prices were higher (by roughly 1.85%) after the fire took place. This, however, does not 
mean that the fire itself increased prices. By looking at the risk variable (risk_adj), we can see 
that housing in riskier areas sold for approximately 5.6% less than housing in non-risky areas, all 
else held constant.  However, this variable is not statistically significant.  The interaction term 
                                                            
1 The regressions were also estimated replacing the census tract variables and city dummy 
variables with separate dummy variables for each census tract.  The regression results were 
similar. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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between risk and after the fire is also negative, which means that houses in risky areas sold for 
even less (by an additional 5.0%) after the fire.  Although not statistically significant, this does 
suggest that perceptions of risk did change after the fire took place.  
 It is possible that the formulation of the risk variable which combines all high levels of 
risk is masking some of the variation.  In column 2 we present results with the risk variable in all 
three categories, with low risk being the excluded group.  Again, the house characteristics are of 
the expected sign and all except the area of the lot are statistically significant.  The census tract 
variables are also of the correct sign and statistical significance, as are the city variables. As in 
Model (1), the coefficient on the variable which indicates if the sale took place after the fire is 
positive and statistically significant; house prices in Boulder County were higher after the fire.   
Houses in the very high risk areas show a statistically significant impact on sales prices, 
with the effect being positive so that these houses sell at a premium of 17.5% over houses in low 
risk areas. Houses in the medium risk area sell at a discount relative to the low risk area, a 
reduction in price of 7.9%.  Being in a high risk area also reduces values (by 8.7%) although this 
figure is not statistically significant, so it would be reasonable to conclude that being in a high 
risk area does not seem to have an impact on price, once other aspects of the house and the 
neighborhood are controlled for. The explanation for the different effects of risk on housing 
prices likely involved the tradeoff between the amenity values of housing in risky area and the 
transportation costs associated with traveling from relatively remote locations in the mountains 
to the employment centers in on the plains. Very high risk areas are disproportionately located 
closer to the plains providing these homes with both superior views and easy access to the area’s 
population centers. High and medium risk areas tend to be both more remote and potentially less 
scenic. 
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The most interesting aspect of the regression results is the effect of the fire on housing 
prices in risky areas. After the fire, the houses in very high risk areas experience a reduction in 
their sales price of  21.9% compared to houses sold in low risk areas after the fire, and that effect 
is statistically significant.  The combined effect of living in a high risk area is that prior to fire 
these homes sold at a statistically significant 17.5% premium compared with homes in low risk 
areas while after the fire, these homes sold at a 4.4% discount (17.5% minus 21.9%). One 
reasonable interpretation of this result is that the fire did indeed impact buyers’ perceptions of 
risk, especially in the highest risk areas.   
When estimating the total economic impact of the fire on the values of houses in Boulder 
County as a result of changes in risk perception, there are a few ways to proceed.  One way to 
calculate loss is to estimate changes in assessed values.  The assessed value for residential single-
family homes in Boulder County in 2014 was $2.637 billion (Boulder County Assessor’s Office, 
2015). If the percentage of homes in risky areas in the county is similar to the percentage in our 
data set (3.9%), and those houses fell in value by 5.0% after the fire (as suggested by the 
coefficient on “risk_adj_eff” in Model (1), then the total decrease in assessed value due to 
changes in perceptions would be $5.142 million.   
Since the coefficient for risk in Model (1) after the wildfire is not statistically significant, 
another option is to consider only those houses that are classified as located in areas that are very 
high risk as in Model (2).  If the percentage of homes in Boulder County that are in very high 
risk areas (0.36%), and the average price premium for houses in very high risk areas (17.5%) 
prior to the fire is the same as in our data set, then the 21.9% fall in house values in those areas 
after the fire represents a total decrease in assessed value of  $2.45 million. 
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In Boulder County, comparing the averaged assessed value to the median market value 
suggests that market value is roughly 12.65 times assessed value. Taking the losses to assessed 
value and adjusting them to market values yields losses of $65 million and $31 million.  When 
compared to the insured losses of $217 million from the fire, the losses to homeowners in 
Boulder County whose homes were not destroyed or damaged are fairly substantial. 
 
Conclusions 
While the damage directly caused by wildfires is clear, this paper seeks to examine the 
effect of wildfires on home prices in at-risk but unaffected areas. While natural disaster risk is 
clearly incorporated in the price of any housing unit, a fire of the magnitude of the Fourmile, 
High Park, or Waldo Canyon fires may serve to change public perceptions of risk in a 
measurable way.   
Our regression results suggest that buyers’ perceptions do change in response to a 
wildfire.  It appears that the buyers that are most impacted are those in the very high risk areas.  
It is possible that prior to the fire, the value those buyers placed on amenities such as views and 
isolation was greater than the value they placed on safety.  After seeing what a fire can do, it 
seems that those weights reversed to the extent that the sales price of the homes in those areas 
fell.  It does not appear that perceptions of risk changed for buyers in the high and medium risk 
areas in Boulder County. 
Overall, the dollar impact to house prices in at-risk but unaffected areas is substantial.  It 
is important to consider these numbers when calculating the potential costs of fires when 
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Fremont County includes Cañon City 
Garfield County includes Glenwood Springs 
La Plata County includes Durango 










Fire County Year Houses
Insurance Costs/ 
Damages (rank) 
Million $ Acreage (rank)
Black Forest El Paso 2013 489 $420.5(2) 14,280 (15) 
Waldo Canyon El Paso 2012 347 $453.7 (1)      18,247 (12) 
High Park Larimer 2012 256 $113.7 (4)  87,250 (3) 
Fourmile Boulder 2010 169 $217.0 (3)        6,181 (25) 
Hayman El Paso 2002 133 $  38.7 (5) 137,760 (1) 
Iron Mountain Fremont 2002 100 $    7.5 (10)        4,439 (29) 
Missionary Ridge La Plata 2002 56 $  17.7 (7)  71,739 (4) 
Hi-Meadow Park 2000 51 $  18.5 (6)    10,800 (20) 
Black Tiger Gulch Boulder 1989 44 $  10.0 (9)        1,778 (38) 
Coal Seam Garfield 2002 29 $    6.4 (11)    12,209 (17) 












Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
lnprice Log of Price of house 12.711 .58710 8.987 16.783 
lot_area Property’s lot area 113800 4232400 26 332000000 
bldg_livin Building’s area 2193.7 1083.0 396 12534 
Age Age of house 30.310 23.095 0 137 
age_sq Age of house squared 1452.0 2320.7 0 18769 
bathrooms # of full bathrooms in unit 2.7293 1.0936 1 9 
bedrooms # of bedrooms in unit 3.3324 .93416 1 9 
pct_white 
Percent of White homeowners 
in census tract 
89.918 6.5508 65.4 100 
pct_black 
Percent of Black homeowners in 
census tract 
1.3763 1.3161 0 5.2 
pct_hispanic 
Percent of Hispanic 
homeowners in census tract 
12.634 12.031 1.4 59.2 
below_poverty 
Percent of homeowners below 
poverty line in census tract 
6.0895 6.7678 0 29.6 
after_dummy 
=1 if sale took place after the 
wildfire 
.46017 .49844 0 1 
Boulder =1 if House located in Boulder .23056 .42122 0 1 
Erie =1 if located in Erie .04850 .21482 0 1 
Lafayette =1 if located in Lafayette .09805 .29740 0 1 
Longmont =1 if located in Longmont .32883 .46981 0 1 
Louisville =1 if located in Louisville .0739126 .26164 0 1 
Lyons =1 if located in Lyons .00798 .08896 0 1 
Nederland =1 if located in Nederland .00510 .07127 0 1 
Superior =1 if located in Superior .04977 .21748 0 1 
very_high_risk 
=1 if located in very high risk 
fire hazard area 
.00362 .06003 0 1 
high_risk 
=1 if located in high risk fire 
hazard area 
.01032 .10105 0 1 
medium_risk 
=1 if located in medium risk fire 
hazard area 
.02584 .158867 0 1 
very_high_eff Very_high_risk * after_dummy .00181 .04248 0 1 
high_eff high_risk * after_dummy .00596 .07695 0 1 
medium_eff medium_risk * after_dummy .01244 .11086 0 1 
risk_adj 
=1 if house in very high, high, 
or medium risk area 
.03977 .19544 0 1 





Average Sales Price Before the Fire After the Fire 
High Risk  $367,527 $348,045 










Distribution of Sales Dates 
 
  
# sales Before fire After fire 
Low Risk 4891 4134 
Medium Risk 126 117 
High Risk 41 56 
Very High Risk 17 17 
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Table 5:  Regression Results  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Ln price Ln price 
lot_area 4.59e-10 4.59e-10 
 (6.14e-10) (6.16e-10) 
bldg_livin 0.000249*** 0.000248*** 
 (7.95e-06) (7.95e-06) 
age -0.00817*** -0.00818*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
age_sq 8.08e-05*** 8.08e-05*** 
 (6.05e-06) (6.05e-06) 
bathrooms 0.0468*** 0.0471*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0057) 
bedrooms 0.0203*** 0.0206*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0057) 
pct_white 0.0064*** 0.0064*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) 
pct_black -0.0112*** -0.0111*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) 
pct_hispanic -0.0048*** -0.0049*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) 
below_poverty -0.0020** -0.0020** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Boulder 0.329*** 0.329*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0155) 
Erie -0.378*** -0.377*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0186) 
Lafayette -0.222*** -0.222*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0169) 
Longmont -0.369*** -0.369*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0162) 
Louisville -0.0392** -0.0391** 
 (0.0156) (0.0157) 
Lyons -0.162*** -0.160*** 
 (0.0357) (0.0358) 
Nederland -0.258*** -0.241*** 
 (0.0524) (0.0558) 
Superior -0.160*** -0.160*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0190) 
after_dummy 0.0185*** 0.0186*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0065) 
very_high_risk  0.175*** 
  (0.0663) 
high_risk  -0.0870 
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  (0.0553) 
medium_risk  -0.0790* 
  (0.0478) 
very_high_eff  -0.219** 
  (0.1060) 
high_eff  0.0228 
  (0.0807) 
medium_eff  -0.0572 
  (0.0674) 
risk_adj -0.0559  
 (0.0366)  
risk_adj_eff -0.0502  
 (0.0501)  
Constant 11.70*** 11.70*** 
 (0.101) (0.101) 
   
Observations 9,403 9,403 
R-squared 0.723 0.724 
   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
